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1 Introduction
Most studies of global agricultural trade liberalization are primarily focused on market
price support – that is agricultural support provided indirectly through border measures,
either import barriers or export subsidies, designed to boost domestic market prices,
relative to world prices (for example, Tyers and Anderson 1992; Martin and Winters
1986). In the late 1980s, this form of support accounted for about 75 per cent of total
Producer Support in agriculture in the member countries of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (OECD 2002). Prior to the Uruguay
Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA), this was also the only area of agricultural
protection under negotiation in the international arena. A very important innovation in
the URAA was to put domestic subsidies on the table. More specifically, support
policies are placed in ‘boxes’ according to their impact on international trade. Those
policies that have ‘no, or at most minimal trade-distorting effects or effects on
production’ are placed in the green box and are not subjected to reduction requirements
under the URAA. Those policies that are deemed to be trade distorting are placed in the
amber box and are subjected to reductions. However, if the payments are accompanied
by programmes aimed at limiting production, they may be placed in yet a third box, the
blue box. As a consequence, they are exempt from the negotiated reductions in support.
This third box has since come under scrutiny and there have been proposals to subject it
to successive reductions as well – or potentially eliminate this box altogether.
As a result of the URAA, the share of producer support provided by market
interventions has gradually fallen, so that it now accounts for only two-thirds of total
support (OECD 2002). This trend may continue as proposed EU reforms involve further
efforts to ‘decouple’ support from world prices (The Economist, July 2002).1 The goal
of this paper is to assess the likely impact of such decoupling on developing country
welfare. In the process of making this assessment, we also pay special attention to the
impact of reforms on real farm income in the reforming OECD countries, as the farm
lobby is a powerful political force and operates as an important constraint on reform
efforts. Due to these dual objectives of the paper, there are necessarily two rather
distinct parts to our analysis. First, we must assess direct impact of domestic support in
the OECD countries on OECD agriculture – specifically farm incomes, production and
subsequently trade. Then we must assess the impact of these changes on the developing
countries. However, before embarking on this analysis, we first turn to an historical
overview of domestic support and OECD trade with developing countries.
2 Background on domestic support and developing country trade
2.1 Overview of domestic support in the OECD
The OECD uses the concept of Producer Subsidy Estimates (PSE) as the principal
indicator in monitoring and evaluating agricultural policy developments. The PSE is ‘an
indicator of the monetary value of gross transfers from consumers and taxpayers to
agricultural producers, measured at the farm-gate level, arising from policy measures
                                                
1 More recently it appears that France and Germany will oppose such reforms (The Economist, 2003).2
that support agriculture, regardless of their natures, objectives or impacts on farm
production or income’. It comprises market price support, payments based on output,
payments based on area planted/animal numbers, payments based on historical
entitlements, payments based on input used, payments based on input constraints,
payments based on overall farming income, and miscellaneous payments (OECD 2001).
The different measures vary in terms of their effects on farm income in the OECD
countries, as well as their effects on trade and hence their impact on the welfare of
developing countries.
Table 1 presents the changes in the overall PSE and its component parts for selected
OECD countries in 1987 and 2000. The PSEs are smallest for Australia and New
Zealand. These are largely made up of market price support and variable input
subsidies. In Australia, for both years, the majority of market price support has been
applied to grains and milk, while most of the applications of subsidies on variable inputs
are applied to meat and meat products. By 2000 most of the PSE had been eliminated in
New Zealand, with large reductions in variable input subsidies in meat and meat
products. In the case of Japan and Korea, the PSEs have remained relatively unchanged
both in level and in composition. The PSE rates have been highest historically for
Switzerland, but here a fair amount of decoupling has occurred, with the share of market
price support in the total falling from 82 per cent in 1987 to 59 per cent in 2000.
Table 1
Producer subsidy equivalent and components, 1987 and 2000
Per cent share in PSE by support type
Per cent share in PSE by support type
OECD region Year PSE %
Market
price
Output Variable
input
Land
based
Historical
entitlement
Australia 1987
2000
7.87
5.56
42.23
24.48
0
2.76
36.57
49.66
0
2.06
0
5.04
Canada 1987
2000
35.84
19.50
49.80
51.22
18.84
7.12
14.09
6.43
15.36
7.63
0
11.29
EU15 1987
2000
45.02
38.34
85.92
58.75
5.51
5.22
5.49
6.64
2.74
25.42
0
0.64
Japan 1987
2000
67.28
64.06
90.68
91.05
2.56
2.80
3.95
4.34
0
0
0
0
Korea 1987
2000
69.47
72.56
98.76
95.86
0
0
0.78
2.45
0
0
0
0
New Zealand 1987
2000
8.87
0.74
26.79
54.43
0
0
70.36
40.31
0
0
0
0
Switzerland 1987
2000
72.96
71.38
81.53
59.09
1.31
3.96
8.56
5.64
6.06
11.27
0
15.86
United States 1987
2000
27.01
21.94
50.82
32.01
5.69
18.85
14.21
13.61
26.60
7.18
0
21.51
Source: OECD PSE/CSE Database 2001.
It is in the USA, Canada and the European Union (EU) where sizable cuts in the PSE
show up over this period – although the recent Farm Bill in the USA has reversed this
trend for that country. In the EU, there has been a decided shift in composition of
support with the share provided by market price support falling in favour of increased3
land- and headage-based payments. In Canada, market price support as a PSE share is
nearly the same but market price support for grains has been greatly reduced while there
has been a large increase in milk MPS. Most support in Canadian grains is now
provided via input (including land) and output subsidies, as well as historical
entitlements. In the US, the PSE has been more moderately reduced with a large portion
of the reduction coming from the elimination of market price support. In 2000 historical
entitlements had become a much more important component of the PSE in US grains.
This change in the mix of producer support in some of the OECD countries is
potentially quite important. It is also expected to continue – and perhaps accelerate –
under a new WTO round. What impact have these historical changes had on world
markets? What about prospective changes? For insights on the potential impact of
changes in the level and mix of domestic support, we turn below to the existing
literature on this topic. But first, let us consider the potential impact that these reforms
will have on developing countries. To understand this, we must first examine the trade
links that will transmit price and quantity changes from OECD countries to developing
countries.
2.2 Overview of developing country trade patterns
Developing countries are an enormously diverse group. Some are net exporters, and
some are net importers of the temperate products that OECD countries tend to protect.
Some are closely tied into the OECD markets – by virtue of geography or perhaps
historical trade preferences. Others are more reliant on other developing countries for
their food supplies and export markets. The strength of the trade links of a developing
country with the OECD countries will play an important role in the impact of OECD
domestic support reform on the developing country. This section provides an overview
of the trade patterns of developing countries vis-à-vis the OECD countries in agriculture
and food products. Data are summarized for the regional and commodity aggregation
used in the study provided in Table 2.
Table 3 reports the average trade specialization indices for three decades over the period
ranging from 1966 to 1998 for the aggregated regions in this study. Trade specialization
indices are calculated as: (X - M) / (X + M) where X are exports and M are imports. The
value of the index ranges from -1 for a country which imports, and does not export, a
particular commodity and +1 for a country which is specialized as an exporter of the
commodity. Table 3 separately identifies the aggregated commodity groups –
programme commodities,2 livestock and meat products, and other agriculture and food
products. Among the developing countries, Argentina has maintained its export
specialization in programme crops over the period. Economic reforms in Vietnam and
India have permitted these countries to shift from being moderate net importers to being
net exporters of programme crops. The net export position of the ASEAN4 region has
seen a decline over the period and Indonesia’s net import position is worsened. China’s
net export position has improved. The Middle East/North Africa (MENA) region has
                                                
2 The programme commodities referred to in this paper are composed of paddy rice, wheat, cereal
grains, oilseeds, raw sugar, processed rice, and refined sugar. The first four are the crops for which the
GTAP database has OECD domestic support data. Processed rice and refined sugar are included since
these are the traded form of rice and sugar, respectively.4
Table 2
Regional and sectoral aggregation
OECD countries
ANZ Australia and New Zealand
Japan Japan
Korea South Korea
USA United States
Canada Canada
Mexico Mexico
EU15 European Union
EFTA European Free Trade Area
CEU Hungary and Poland
Turkey Turkey
Developing countries
China China
Indonesia Indonesia
Vietnam Vietnam
ASEAN4 Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand
India India
RsoAsia Rest of South Asia
Argentina Argentina
Brazil Brazil
RlatAm Rest of Latin America
FSU Former Soviet Union
MENA Middle East and North Africa
Tanzania Tanzania
Zambia Zambia
R_SSA Rest of sub-Saharan Africa
ROW Rest of World
Programme commodities
pdrice paddy rice
wheat wheat
crsgrns cereal grains nec.
oilsds oilseeds
rawsgr sugar cane, sugar beet
pcrice processed rice
refsgr sugar
Livestock and meat products
ruminants cattle/sheep, wool
nonrumnts animal products nec.
rawmilk raw milk
rummeat meat: cattle/sheep
nrummeat meat products nec.
dairy dairy products
Other agriculture and food
othcrops vegetables and fruits, plant-based fibers, other crops
vegoilfat vegetable oils and fats
othprfood other processed food
mnfc manufactures
srvc services5
Table 3
Trade specialization indices: (X-M)/(X+M)
Programme commodities Livestock and meat products Other agriculture and food
regions Regions
1965-75 1976-85 1986-98 1965-75 1976-85 1986-98 1965-75 1976-85 1986-98
Aus/NZ 0.95 0.97 0.94 0.99 0.98 0.98  0.13 0.10 0.32
Japan -0.94 -0.96 -1.00 -0.96 -0.96 -0.96 -0.60 -0.67 -0.82
Korea -0.90 -0.82 -0.90 -0.14 -0.73 -0.85 -0.23 -0.23 -0.21
USA 0.59 0.78 0.81 -0.04 0.16 0.24 -0.08 -0.04 0.00
Canada 0.55 0.72 0.76 0.13 0.32 0.40 -0.18 -0.18 -0.09
Mexico 0.19 -0.87 -0.83 0.03 -0.41 -0.54 0.66 0.56 0.36
EU15 -0.74 -0.56 -0.27 -0.49 -0.05 0.13 -0.48 -0.37 -0.17
EFTA -0.91 -0.89 -0.76 -0.08 -0.02 -0.04 -0.27 -0.27 -0.08
CEU -0.51 -0.71 0.03 0.57 0.44 0.50 -0.20 -0.28 -0.15
Turkey -0.54 0.25 -0.51 0.04 0.55 -0.32 0.86 0.79 0.43
China -0.17 -0.55 -0.18 0.87 0.69 0.38 0.22 0.36 0.28
Indonesia -0.57 -0.88 -0.88 0.13 -0.11 -0.30 0.74 0.71 0.52
Vietnam* n.a. -0.37 0.85 n.a. -0.65 -0.01 n.a. -0.10 0.48
ASEAN4 0.58 0.49 0.20 -0.74 -0.30 -0.34 0.48 0.55 0.38
India -0.58 -0.15 0.43 -0.40 -0.24 -0.10 0.43 0.24 0.44
RsoAsia -0.59 -0.16 -0.40 -0.43 -0.70 -0.67 0.45 0.13 -0.02
Argentina 0.97 0.99 0.96 0.99 0.92 0.75 0.64 0.71 0.78
Brazil 0.58 0.15 0.29 0.51 0.47 0.35 0.79 0.85 0.66
RlatAm 0.36 0.07 -0.08 -0.17 -0.23 -0.23 0.56 0.56 0.57
FSU n.a. n.a. -0.63 n.a. n.a. -0.59 n.a. n.a. -0.31
MENA -0.91 -0.97 -0.94 -0.80 -0.94 -0.87 -0.01 -0.54 -0.45
Tanzania n.a. n.a. -0.40 n.a. n.a. 0.18 n.a. n.a. 0.69
Zambia -0.35 -0.40 -0.40 -0.88 -0.78 -0.59 -0.38 -0.15 0.34
R_SSA 0.39 -0.13 -0.17 0.37 -0.05 -0.25 0.68 0.54 0.53
ROW -0.10 -0.43 -0.66 -0.27 -0.50 -0.45 -0.16 -0.25 -0.43
Source: Authors’ calculations from bilateral time series data in GTAP 5 data package.
Note: * The time series trade data for Vietnam starts in 1976 while that for the Former Soviet Union and
Tanzania start in 1992.
been a consistently strong net importer of programme commodities. Among the OECD
countries, Australia/New Zealand (ANZ) has been consistent in its net export position.
The USA and Canada’s net export position has strengthened over the period. The EU15
and EFTA have substantially reduced their net imports as a share of total trade, while
Japan and Korea remain consistent net importers of programme commodities over the
entire period. Overall, we conclude that increased domestic support for programme
crops appears to have contributed to improvements in the net trade position of the
OECD countries in programme crops, at the expense of developing countries.
Turning next to livestock products, we see from Table 3 that China, Argentina and
Brazil are net exporters. The specialization indices for these countries, however, have
declined over the years. On the other hand, the net import positions of India and
ASEAN4 in these products have diminished markedly. In the OECD countries, the ANZ
region stands out as a strong net exporter of livestock and meat products. Japan is a
strong net importer and Korea’s net import position has increased over the period. On
the other hand, the USA, Canada and the EU have seen increases in their trade
specialization indices over the period. Increased domestic support for livestock products
in these countries appear to have contributed to their net export position.6
Most of the developing countries are consistent net exporters of the aggregate group of
other agriculture and processed food products. Among the OECD countries, Mexico,
Turkey and ANZ are net exporters while the other OECD countries in our aggregation
are net importers. Thus we have a rough division between temperate products
(programme crops and livestock), where OECD domestic support plays an important
role and where developing countries are largely net importers, and tropical products for
which developing countries are largely net exporters.3
Focusing next on developing country bilateral trade with the OECD, Table 4 reports
separately the share of each developing country’s total trade that is specifically with
OECD countries. Tanzania, Zambia, and Indonesia rely on the OECD market as a
destination for more than three-quarters of their exports of programme commodities. On
the other end of the scale are Vietnam, Argentina, and the rest of South Asia, of which
each rely on the OECD market as destination for less than a quarter of their programme
commodity exports. This indicates that a strong net exporter like Argentina competes
with the OECD in third markets for programme commodities. On the import side, the
OECD is the source of more than two-thirds of total programme commodity imports of
countries like China, Indiana and the rest of South Asia and MENA region. For these
countries, reductions in domestic support for OECD agriculture will mean higher priced
imports. Reforms in OECD market price support may significantly affect the trade
patterns in these countries.
Table 4
Share of developing country trade with OECD, 1997
Programme commodities Livestock and meat Other agriculture and food Developing
countries Exports* Imports** Exports* Imports** Exports* Imports**
C h i n a 5 27 6 6 0 8 55 54 4
Indonesia 78 58 69 95 27 44
Vietnam 13 56 7482 24 40
ASEAN4 40 48 54 71 47 44
India 27 75 5285 31 24
R s o A s i a 2 36 6 6 1 8 16 21 8
Argentina 23 58 38 35 57 36
Brazil 48 21 71 33 50 36
RLatAm 47 63 77 69 47 51
F S U 3 72 3 5 0 8 04 86 3
MENA 43 66 73 80 66 60
Tanzania 89 31 54 60 54 25
Z a m b i a8 6 7 6 9 9 36 54 3
R_SSA 63 49 77 82 69 62
R O W 6 27 3 5 9 6 66 26 1
Source: Authors’ calculations from GTAP 5 Data Base.
Notes: * Exports to OECD countries as share of each developing country’s total exports of the commodity
group. ** Imports from OECD countries as share to each developing country’s total imports of the
commodity group.
                                                
3 In order to keep the tables manageable, the other agriculture category also includes food products. If
this latter were removed, we would see even more significant net exports from the developing
countries.7
Even greater dependence on the OECD countries as an import source is exhibited by
countries like China, Indonesia, Vietnam, South Asia, FSU, MENA, Zambia and the
rest of sub-Saharan Africa in the case of livestock and meat products, with each
importing more than 80 per cent of their total imports of these commodities from the
OECD. Bilateral exports and imports of developing countries for other agriculture and
food commodities are generally less concentrated on the OECD.
Within the group of programme commodities and OECD countries, there is also a great
deal of heterogeneity regarding the bilateral trading patterns of developing countries.
Table 5 reports the shares of bilateral trade of the developing countries with three major
OECD members – Japan, USA and EU – for wheat, a commodity which receives
significant OECD border protection and domestic support. The first two columns of
data report each developing country’s share of world trade in 1997 in wheat while the
next six columns report the share of each OECD country as export destination or import
source of each developing country’s total trade in wheat. Developing countries as a
group export 14 per cent and import 54 per cent of total wheat traded in the world. The
USA and EU each account for a quarter of total world wheat exports. Argentina has an
8.8 per cent share of total wheat trade but its export share to the OECD countries is very
small, Argentina relies on markets other than these three OECD regions. The MENA
region imports 21 per cent of the total wheat traded. Thirty per cent of its wheat imports
are sourced from the US and 18 per cent from the EU. The ASEAN4, rest of South
Asia, and rest of Latin America each account for roughly 4 per cent share of world
wheat imports. The US provides around half of total wheat imported by these countries.
The data examined for wheat in this section of the paper is representative of the broader
picture of OECD – developing country agricultural trade linkages that are quite
important for many products. In the more general case of OECD supported programme
crops and livestock products, many developing countries rely heavily on the OECD for
a large share of their imports. These countries may well be hurt by the current trend
towards decoupling domestic support from production decisions as OECD supply prices
are likely to rise as a consequence. On the other hand, those developing countries that
rely heavily on the OECD as an export destination, or that compete with OECD
products in third markets stand to gain from measures that decouple domestic support
from production decisions.
We turn now to a review of the literature analyzing the impact of domestic support on
production decisions in OECD agriculture.
3 Literature review
The earliest work assessing the impact of different methods of agricultural support on
prices, and factor returns in agriculture is that of Floyd (1965). He compared the impact
of price supports with output restrictions and mandatory land retirement. He does not
consider the possibility of producer payments based on land use. However, we have
seen above, input-based payments have become increasingly common in recent years.
Hertel (1989) develops a series of propositions relating to the impacts of a wider range
of support measures on production, net exports, employment, land rents and farm
income. He places these on both an equal cost and equal PSE basis for a single product,
agricultural sector in the absence of pre-existing support. A few key points emerge from8
Table 5
Shares of developing country trade, 1997
Shares of total developing country trade Shares of total
world trade Japan USA EU Developing
countries
X M XMXMXM
Wheat
China 0.1 3.2 15 0 16 11 39 2
Indonesia 0.0 3.1 14 0 14 1 35 0
Vietnam 0.0 0.0 17 0 25 41 29 0
ASEAN4 0.1 3.7 0 0 0 52 00
I n d i a 0 . 2 1 . 1 8090 2 20
RsoAsia 0.0 4.4 14 0 15 46 36 6
Argentina 8.8 0.0 000010
B r a z i l 0 . 1 4 . 1 000000
RlatAm 0.5 4.9 1 0 1 45 4 10
FSU 2.5 2.3 0 0 0 11 1 12
MENA 1.4 21.1 4 0 5 30 12 18
Tanzania 0.0 0.1 12 0 12 0 30 0
Z a m b i a 0 . 0 0 . 0 000000
R_SSA 0.1 3.2 1 0 1 35 2 33
Sugar
C h i n a 1 . 3 2 . 1 412053
Indonesia 0.3 2.8 33041 1 05
Vietnam 0.1 0.0 5 0 20 0 9 1
ASEAN4 9.3 2.3 1809016
I n d i a 2 . 0 0 . 6 2050 3 1 1 3
R s o A s i a0 . 6 2 . 7 2020 7 38
Argentina 0.6 0.1 0 0 43 0 0 2
B r a z i l 1 4 . 7 0 . 0 00762 1 2
RlatAm 18.1 3.9 3 0 26 6 18 3
F S U 2 . 4 9 . 1 00003 1 1
M E N A 0 . 9 1 5 . 5 8090 2 9 4 7
T a n z a n i a 0 . 1 0 . 4 6060 7 81
Z a m b i a 0 . 2 0 . 0 0102 9 7 1 7
R_SSA 7.6 4.9 4 0 10 0 61 35
Rice
C h i n a 6 . 3 3 . 2 1 0160 1 40
Indonesia 1.2 1.3 16 0 16 0 39 0
V i e t n a m4 . 8 0 . 0 037010
ASEAN4 18.6 8.8 5 0 13 1 12 0
I n d i a 1 7 . 0 0 . 0 1640 1 3 1 3
R s o A s i a6 . 3 2 . 3 103040
Argentina 3.1 0.1 041201
B r a z i l 0 . 1 3 . 7 5061 1 50
RlatAm 7.3 6.8 1 0 1 48 24 1
F S U 0 . 3 2 . 0 5154 1 38
MENA 1.3 12.9 2 0 2 10 3 4
Tanzania 0.0 0.3 16 0 16 0 40 0
Zambia 0.0 0.0 12 1 17 0 20 30
R_SSA 0.6 4.7 10 2 13 22 24 3
Source: Authors’ calculations from GTAP 5 Data Base.9
this paper. First of all, subsidies on variable inputs that substitute for fixed factors (for
example, land) in agriculture have a greater impact on output, and hence trade, than do
equal cost output subsidies. Such variable input subsidies also moderate the share of
producer  support  that  accrues  to  land  and  other  fixed  factors.  On  the  other  hand,
subsidies to land, such as the per hectare payments currently made in the EU, have a
more modest effect on output, while leading to higher land rents than under an equal cost
output  subsidy.  Finally,  when  compared  to  an  output  subsidy  of  equal  cost,  export
subsidies have a larger impact on exports, agricultural production, employment, and land
rents, provided the elasticity of export demand exceeds the domestic demand elasticity.
Subsequent work in this area has been largely computational in nature. Abler and Shortle
(1992)  focus  their  attention  on  the  relationship  between  chemical  restrictions  and
existing farm programmes in the US and the EU. They find that unilateral restrictions on
chemical usage benefit US farmers, while leading to losses on the part of EU producers.
Gunter et al. (1996) focus on input market interventions as well, evaluating their impact
on  competing  policy  goals  in  the  context  of  a  three  region,  US-EU-ROW,  partial
equilibrium model of wheat markets. Of special interest for the  present  paper  is  the
recently completed OECD (2001) report on ‘Market Effects of Crop Support Measures’.
In this report, the authors compare the impacts of a wide range of producer support
across OECD countries. They find that the movement from market price support and
output subsidies to land-based payments is a ‘win-win’ scenario in most countries – with
farm income rising and world price impacts of support falling.4 From the point of view
of this paper, this suggests an interesting possibility, namely that re-instrumentation of
producer support for agriculture in OECD countries could conceivably maintain OECD
farm incomes, while contributing to enhanced welfare on the part of developing country
exporters. This hypothesis will be explored in greater detail below.
In a separate study, also undertaken by the OECD Agriculture Directorate, Thompson
and Smith (2002) study the impact of further agricultural trade reforms on developing
countries. They use two modelling frameworks. The OECD AgLink model is used to
examine the impacts of reductions in market price support, while the GTAP model is
used to examine the impacts of cuts in both market price support and direct payments to
producers. They look at relatively broad groups of developing countries, and they do not
consider more elaborate reforms in which the mix of measures is changed in an attempt
to maintain farm incomes.
In contrast, Frandsen et al. (2002) use a modified version of the GTAP model to
examine the impact of further decoupling of domestic support in the EU. Their
emphasis is on the budgetary and macro-economic effects of these policy reforms
among OECD countries. They argue that further decoupling of EU agricultural policies
would reduce budgetary exposure in the EU as well as bringing it into compliance with
potentially stricter WTO disciplines on domestic support. They also find rather
substantial changes in world prices – particularly for meat products, although they do
not examine the issue of overall developing country welfare explicitly, and they restrict
themselves to EU reforms.
                                                
4 One cautionary note – as anticipated in the results of Hertel (1989) is that a shift towards variable
input subsidies could have the opposite effect – with larger world price impacts and smaller farm-
income benefits10
The goal of this paper is to assess the impact of changes in both the mix and the level of
domestic support in OECD countries on the welfare of farm households in the OECD
and on the national welfare of developing countries. Therefore, it is not enough to say
that world prices will rise or they will fall. The welfare impacts on developing countries
will depend on whether they are net exporters or net importers of protected products. It
will also depend on the bilateral trade patterns discussed in Section 2. Are they closely
tied into the OECD markets in which these changes occur? In short, we need a global
trade model with bilateral trade flows explicitly treated. One such framework is offered
by the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) database and associated models, used by
a number of the preceding studies.
Since the early 1990s, there has been a large number of global, general equilibrium,
analyses of trade liberalization – some of which include domestic support (these include
Francois et al. 1996; Hertel et al. 1996; Harrison et al. 1996; Anderson et al. 1999;
Elbehri et al. 1999; Hertel and Martin 1999; Anderson et al. 2001; Rae and Strutt 2002).
Most of these studies are based on the GTAP database and modelling framework.
However, the GTAP database has not been particularly well-suited to the analysis of
domestic support issues. Versions 1–4 of the GTAP database treated all domestic
support as an output subsidy. Version 5 introduced a first-cut disaggregation of support
across inputs (Dimaranan 2002), but it still suffers from some important limitations
(Gehlhar and Nelson 2001; Frandsen et al. 2001). Furthermore, the standard GTAP
model is not well-suited to analysis of domestic support issues, due to its relatively
simplistic treatment of factor markets. One contribution of the present paper is to
address these limitations. Thus we now turn to the issue of model design.
4 Methodology
4.1 Model design
For purposes of this study, we have constructed a special purpose version of the GTAP
database and model, designed to make it more appropriate for the analysis of domestic
support. We adopt, as our starting point, the general framework proposed by the OECD
(2001)  in  which  factor  demand  and  supply  relations  play  a  central  role.  The  most
valuable contribution of this report resides in the annexes, where extensive literature
reviews are available for the EU and for North America. The authors provide central
parameter values for the  key  elasticities of  substitution, as  well  as  for  factor  supply
elasticities (see tables A1.3 and A1.4 of OECD 2001). We have restructured the GTAP
model in order to take advantage of this information and it is to these features that we
now turn.
We begin by segmenting the factor markets for labour and capital between agriculture
and non-agriculture. A key parameter in the OECD analysis is the elasticity of factor
supply for farm-owned inputs. The values of these parameters, as well as the ranges,
proposed by the OECD are reported in Table 6. Note that these values are less than one,
which is a sharp contrast to the usual assumption of perfect factor mobility used in most
CGE analyses. This means that commodity supply is also less responsive, and more of
the benefits of farm subsidies (or losses from their elimination) will accrue to farm
households.11
Table 6
Factor supply and substitution elasticities adapted from OECD (2001)*
Factor supply
elasticity
Elasticity of substitution among:
Regions**
Farm-owned
factors
Purchased and
farm owned
Land and farm
owned
Purchased
factors (inputs)
Aus/NZ 0.40 0.90 0.10 0.10
Japan 0.50 0.40 0.30 0.30
(0.10 - 0.90) (0 - 0.80) (0 - 0.60) (0 - 0.60)
Korea 0.50 0.40 0.30 0.30
USA 0.40 0.80 0.30 0.15
(0.10 - 0.70) (0 - 1.60) (0 - 0.60) (0 - 0.30)
Canada 0.40 0.90 0.10 0.10
(0.10 - 0.70) (0 - 1.80) (0 - 0.20) (0 - 0.20)
Mexico 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.15
(0.30 - 0.70) (0 - 1.00) (0 - 1.00) (0 - 0.30)
EU15 0.50 0.90 0.40 0.50
(0.10 - 0.90) (0.30 - 1.50) (0 - 0.80) (0 - 1.00)
EFTA 0.50 0.90 0.40 0.50
(0.10 - 0.90) (0.30 - 1.50) (0 - 0.80) (0 - 1.00)
CEU 0.50 0.90 0.40 0.50
Turkey 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.15
China 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.15
Indonesia 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.15
Vietnam 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.15
ASEAN4 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.15
India 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.15
RSoAsia 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.15
Argentina 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.15
Brazil 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.15
RLatAm 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.15
FSU 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.15
MENA 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.15
Tanzania 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.15
Zambia 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.15
R_SSA 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.15
ROW 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.15
Source: OECD (2001).
Notes: * Data ranges in parentheses. ** The data provided in OECD (2001) cover only Japan,
USA, Canada, Mexico, EU, and Switzerland. We adapted data Canada’s data for Australia/New
Zealand, Japan’s data for Korea, and Switzerland’s data for EFTA. Data for Mexico was
assigned to the CEU (Hungary and Poland), Turkey and all the developing countries.
The OECD report also attempts to come up with supply elasticities for purchased inputs.
However, there is little econometric evidence to draw on here. One advantage of the
general  equilibrium  framework  is  that  these  commodity  supply  responses  are
endogenously determined – as a function of the factor market assumptions as well as the
cost structure of the industry. Therefore, we dispense with the OECD estimates of input
supply for fertilizer and other purchased inputs. The supply prices for the 18 different
intermediate inputs are endogenous in the model and determined by the interaction of
supply and demand in each of these markets.12
On the factor demand side, we employ a nested-CES production function which can be
calibrated to the three key elasticities of substitution available from the OECD report
(Table  6).  Specifically,  we  postulate  that  output  is  a  CES  composite  of  two  input
aggregates. The first of these is a purchased input aggregate, while the second is a value-
added  aggregate.  The  individual  inputs  in  each  of  these  groups  are  assumed  to  be
separable from one another – with a common elasticity of substitution. The purchased
input and value-added aggregates are themselves each a CES function of individual farm
inputs. This gives us a total of three CES substitution parameters. They are calibrated to
the OECD central values for the Allen partial elasticities of substitution between: (i) land
and other farm-owned inputs, (ii) land and purchased inputs, and (iii) among purchased
inputs. These values are reported in Table 6 for the OECD countries covered in the
report. These parameters are not critical for our analysis of the non-OECD impacts, since
domestic policies in these countries are unchanged in our simulations. Accordingly, we
simply  set  these  parameter  values  equal  to  those  from  Mexico  for  all  non-OECD
countries in the model.
Given our interest in tracking real farm income and the overall measure of support for
OECD agriculture, we also add some additional equations to the model to determine
these variables. Real farm income is based on payments to endowments in the farm
sector, adjusted for depreciation and the farm sector’s share of national net taxes. To
obtain real farm income, we deflate this by the regional household’s price index which is
computed in the standard GTAP model. In some simulations, real farm income is treated
as exogenous, and a policy instrument is endogenized in order to maintain this target
level of income.
The computation of PSEs in the GTAP model is complicated by the fact that traded
commodities are differentiated by origin. So the model tracks bilateral trade and there is
no unique world price. Therefore, the domestic-world price gap is measured as a trade-
weighted combination of bilateral import and export prices. In the case of market price
support,  this  price  gap  is  applied  to  output  in  order  to  compute  the  change  in  PSE
associated with a given policy change. In some simulations, the PSE – either at the
commodity or sector level – is exogenized and a policy instrument is endogenized to
maintain this pre-specified level of support.
Finally, given the importance of the trade elasticities to our analysis, we have
incorporated recent estimates, implemented at the disaggregated GTAP level, based on
the methodology outlined in Hummels (1999). Here, he uses detailed trade, tariff and
transport cost data for a variety of importing countries in North and South America to
estimate a differentiated products model of import demand. The variation in bilateral
transport costs permits him to get quite precise estimates of these parameters – in sharp
contrast to much of the earlier work in this area.
The remainder of the model follows the standard GTAP framework, with sectors
producing output under perfect competition and constant returns to scale. Consumer
demands are modeled using the non-homothetic, CDE functional form, calibrated to
estimates of price and income elasticities of demand. Bilateral trade flows are modeled
using the common, Armington approach under which products are differentiated by
origin. Bilateral transport costs between countries are explicitly modeled, and a global
‘bank’ serves to close the model with respect to global savings and investment.13
4.2 Data and aggregation
The study uses an aggregation of a revised version of the GTAP 5 database (Dimaranan
and McDougall 2002). In the GTAP 5 database, all the different components of OECD
PSE data except for market price support are distributed into four classifications of
domestic support namely: output subsidies intermediate input subsidies, land-based
payments and capital based payments (Jensen 2002). In contrast to GTAP 5, the land-
based payments were revised to separately handle payments on historical entitlements.
Their effect is now neutral across programme commodities. The region and sector
aggregation of the GTAP database used in the study is a laid out in Table 2.
4.3 Experimental design
Five sets of simulations are used in this paper to analyze the impacts of changes in
OECD domestic support on developing regions. The experimental design is outlined in
the list below.
Experimental design
(a) Stylized shocks Perturbations equivalent to a one per cent increase in the PSE,
assuming no initial subsidies applied to each of market price
support, output subsidy, input subsidy, and area payments for
wheat in the EU (Table 7).
(b) Interactions with
existing subsidies
Land subsidy, variable input subsidy, output subsidy, or market
price support is allowed to adjust to maintain when a one per
cent shock is applied to the EU15 PSE (Table 7).
(c) Policy reform and re-
instrumentation for EU
wheat
EU wheat land subsidy is allowed to adjust to maintain a
constant real farm income condition when market price support
is reduced by 50 per cent (Tables 8-9).
(d) 50 per cent cuts in
OECD domestic
Support
Comprehensive reform of domestic support in OECD for all
countries and all commodities: 50 per cent cuts in all domestic
support instruments (Tables 10-12).
(e) 50 per cent cuts in
OECD market price
support with re-
instrumentation
Comprehensive reform of market price support, including 50 per
cent cuts in tariffs and export subsidies, with a compensating
increase in payments to land, designed to stabilize real farm
income in each OECD country (Tables 13-15).
The first set of simulations involves shocking each type of domestic support and market
price support by the PSE equivalent of a one per cent increase in market price support.
These equal PSE conditions are derived in Hertel (1989) under the assumption of zero
initial distortion. These results are the key to understanding the domestic support model,
as the equal PSE condition as derived here highlights the relative responsiveness of key
indicators to equivalent changes in support measures.
The  second  set  of  simulations  builds  on  the  first  by  enforcing  an  actual  equal  PSE
condition on the model solution. This is done by solving the model in response to a one
per cent shock to the EU15 PSE, with the change in a particular support instrument being
considered made endogenous. The results for these simulations highlight the importance
of  interactions  of  changes  in  support  instruments  as  well  as  the  importance  of  pre-
existing tax/subsidy levels in a reform process that changes the composition of support.14
Table 7
Equal PSE comparison across alternative support instruments
Equal PSE stylized:
+1% shock
Equal PSE actual:
+1% PSE shock
EU15 indicator Land Output MPS Input Land Output MPS Input
Initial support level 0* 0* 0* 0* -90.6% 0.47% –a -16.5%
Change in instrument -15.20 1.00 1.00 -2.17 -1.61 0.62 0.82 -1.90
Land rental – index 4.57 0.39 0.16 -0.01 0.37 0.24 0.13 -0.01
Land rental – wheat 16.15 1.28 0.56 -0.07 1.19 0.79 0.45 -0.06
Export price – wheat -0.14 -0.92 -0.94 -1.04 -0.32 -0.57 -0.77 -0.91
Output – wheat 0.10 0.76 0.32 0.90 0.03 0.47 0.26 0.79
Exports – wheat 0.15 1.09 0.75 1.27 0.04 0.67 0.61 1.11
Real farm income 0.98 0.10 0.04 -0.01 0.09 0.06 0.04 -0.01
Source: Authors’ simulations.
Notes: a Varies by importing or exporting region; * Zero initial distortion is assumed.
Table 8
Implications of 50 per cent reduction in market price support for EU15 wheat, with
re-instrumentation
EU15 variable Per cent change
Change in area payments -8.6
Land rents 0.3
Wheat acreage planted 0.0
Labour use -3.4
Capital use -3.3
Output price -0.7
Output quantity -3.3
Export price 0.6
Export quantity -7.5
World price 0.4
Equivalent variation US$ million
EU15 187.8
OECD-FSU aggregate 246.7
Developing region aggregate -69.0
Source: Authors’ simulations.15
Table 9
Developing region welfare: EU15 wheat market price support reform in US$ millions
(percentage change in parentheses)
Equivalent variation Terms of trade components
Region* Total
Alloc.
efficiency I-S effect TOT
World
price
Export
price
Import
price
LDC total
(-0.67) -65.5 -9.6 -0.8 -55.2 -34.7 12.7 -33.2
China
(-0.91)
-4.8
(-0.001) -2.8 -0.2 -1.8
(-0.001)
-2.1
(-0.001)
2.5
(0.001)
-2.2
(0.001)
Indonesia
(-1.00)
-3.1
(-0.002)
-0.1 0.0 -3.0
(-0.005)
-3.4
(-0.006)
0.7
(0.001)
-0.3
(0.000)
Vietnam
(-1.00)
-0.0
(-0.000)
-0.0 0.0 -0.0
(-0.000)
-0.1
(-0.002)
0.1
(0.003)
-0.0
(0.000)
ASEAN4
(-0.97)
-3.9
(-0.001)
-0.9 -0.1 -3.0
(-0.001)
-3.6
(-0.001)
2.5
(0.001)
-1.9
(0.001)
India
(-0.83)
-0.4
(-0.000)
-0.2 0.0 -0.2
(-0.000)
-1.8
(-0.003)
1.3
(0.002)
0.3
(-0.000)
RsoAsia
(-1.00)
-6.3
(-0.005)
-1.1 -0.2 -5.0
(-0.019)
-4.2
(-0.016)
0.1
(0.000)
-1.0
(0.004)
Argentina
(1.00)
7.0
(0.002)
0.8 0.3 5.9
(0.020)
5.8
(0.020)
0.3
(0.001)
-0.2
(0.001)
Brazil
(-0.96)
-3.6
(-0.001)
-1.0 -0.1 -2.5
(-0.003)
-3.7
(-0.005)
0.8
(0.001)
0.4
(-0.001)
RlatAmer
(-0.86)
-10.1
(-0.002)
-1.6 -0.1 -8.3
(-0.006)
-6.5
(-0.004)
4.4
(0.003)
-6.2
(0.004)
MENA
(-0.88)
-29.6
(-0.005)
-2.0 0.0 -27.6
(-0.012)
-11.7
(-0.005)
0.8
(0.000)
-16.7
(0.007)
Tanzania
(-1.00)
-0.1
(-0.002)
-0.0 0.0 -0.1
(-0.005)
-0.1
(-0.007)
0.0
(0.001)
0.0
(-0.000)
Zambia
(0.76)
0.0
(0.000)
0.0 0.0 0.0
(0.001)
-0.0
(-0.000)
-0.0
(-0.000)
0.0
(-0.002)
R_SSA
(-0.94)
-10.4
(-0.004)
-0.8 -0.1 -9.6
(-0.010)
-3.2
(-0.003)
-0.8
(-0.001)
-5.5
(-0.006)
Source: Author’s simulations.
Note: * Specialization indices in italics.16
Table 10
Change in average world prices due to comprehensive OECD domestic support reform
(50 per cent reduction) (percentage change in parentheses)
Contribution by tax/subsidy to world price change
Commodity
World price
change Output
Intermediate
input Land Capital
pdrice 0.26 0.12 0.34 0.05 -0.23
wheat 4.91 1.03 1.68 1.11 1.09
crsgrns 5.5 1.42 1.79 1.02 1.27
oilsds 3.53 0.92 1.21 0.79 0.6
rawsgr -0.58 0.09 0.14 -0.33 -0.48
othcrops -1.5 -0.01 -0.03 -0.69 -0.77
ruminants 4.3 0.48 0.95 -0.38 3.25
nonrumnts 0.54 0.26 0.45 -0.14 -0.02
rawmilk 0.21 0.14 0.81 -0.33 -0.4
pcrice 0.27 0.13 0.12 0.06 -0.03
vegoilfat 0.97 0.2 0.34 0.24 0.2
refsgr -0.06 0.05 0.06 -0.03 -0.15
rummeat 2.21 0.31 0.56 -0.11 1.44
nrummeat 0.43 0.17 0.28 -0.06 0.04
dairy -0.19 0.14 0.36 -0.27 -0.43
othprfood 0.22 0.06 0.11 0.07 -0.03
mnfc 0.12 0.01 0 0.1 0.01
srvc 0.11 0.01 0 0.1 -0.01
Source: Authors’ simulation.17
Table 11
Developing region welfare changes: domestic support reform in US$ millions
(percentage in parentheses)
Equivalent variation Terms of trade components
Region Total
Alloc.
efficiency I-S effect TOT
World
price
Export
price
Import
price
China -69.1
(-0.009) -69.6 -18.0 18.5
(0.005)
-51.8
(-0.015)
137.1
(0.039)
-66.8
(0.019)
Indonesia -13.6
(-0.007) 0.8 -1.9 -12.4
(-0.021)
-54.5
(-0.095)
35.5
(0.062)
6.6
(-0.012)
Vietnam
-8.2
(-0.042)
-1.9 0.3 -6.6
(-0.071)
-10.0
(-0.107)
5.8
(0.062)
-2.4
(0.026)
ASEAN4 -15.2
(-0.004) 4.9 -4.3 -15.9
(-0.004)
-47.4
(-0.013)
113.4
(0.031)
-81.9
(0.022)
India 35.9
(0.010) 15.2 -2.1 22.8
(0.049)
-22.9
(-0.049)
38.6
(0.083)
7.1
(-0.015)
RsoAsia -44.2
(-0.037) -3.3 -1.2 -39.7
(-0.149)
-57.2
(-0.214)
17.2
(0.064)
0.3
(-0.001)
Argentina 157.3
(0.053) 26.2 10.6 120.5
(0.428)
183.1
(0.653)
-53.1
(-0.189)
-9.5
(0.034)
Brazil 200.2
(0.029) 73.3 31.9 94.9
(0.173)
1.1
(0.002)
88.5
(0.161)
5.3
(-0.010)
RlatAmer -214.3
(-0.050) -29.9 -1.0 -183.4
(-0.135)
-244.7
(-0.180)
101.8
(0.075)
-40.5
(0.030)
MENA -270.1
(-0.045) -50.6 -1.8 -217.7
(-0.091)
-315.9
(-0.132)
83.1
(0.035)
15.1
(-0.006)
Tanzania -7.0
(-0.111) -1.2 -1.0 -4.9
(-0.420)
-7.1
(-0.608)
1.8
(0.154)
0.4
(-0.035)
Zambia 0.0
(0.000) 0.2 0.0 -0.3
(-0.017)
-1.4
(-0.103)
0.4
(0.031)
0.7
(-0.055)
R_SSA -126.1
(-0.424) -16.0 -2.1 -108.0
(-0.120)
-149.7
(-0.166)
31.1
(0.034)
10.6
(-0.012)
ROW 17.1
(0.002) 27.7 -1.1 -9.4
(-0.001)
-221.4
(-0.029)
285.9
(0.037)
-73.9
(0.010)
LDC Total -357.3 -24.2 8.4 -341.6 -999.7 887.0 -228.9
Source: Authors’ simulations.18
Table 12
Terms of trade welfare contribution decomposed by region and commodity: comprehensive 50 per cent reduction in OECD domestic support in US$ millions
World price effects by region
Com. China Indon. Vnam ASEAN Ind. RSoA Arg. Braz
RLat
Amer MENA Tanz. Zamb. R_SSA ROW
Total
world
price
effect
Export
price
effect
Import
price
effect
pdrice 0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 -0.9 -1.3
wheat -25.6 -33.9 -0.2 -38.8 -10.4 -47.0 69.2 -27.9 -42.3 -145.9 -0.3 0.0 -28.6 -44.5 -376.2 -82.3 68.8
crsgrns 47.5 -8.0 0.2 -21.2 0.6 -0.5 71.7 -1.8 -42.5 -103.7 0.2 -0.5 0.5 -113.4 -171.0 -176.6 77.8
oilsds -28.7 -10.5 0.9 -17.7 9.0 -2.0 5.1 56.1 17.6 -10.7 0.4 0.1 7.0 -47.7 -21.0 -135.3 14.6
rawsgr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.1 0.2 -0.2
othcrop -2.1 -7.5 -11.8 10.1 -26.3 0.7 -18.6 -49.9 -186.4 -5.6 -7.5 -0.9 -131.1 92.0 -344.8 606.7 -123.8
rumin -20.0 -6.8 -0.1 -8.0 -6.1 -0.1 3.4 -1.6 3.7 -14.7 0.0 0.0 2.4 -19.6 -67.6 -48.7 30.7
nrumin 3.8 0.5 0.2 -0.5 0.2 0.0 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.1 0.0 0.7 -8.5 -1.8 -14.4 1.8
rawmlk 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0
pcrice 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.7 1.1 0.4 0.2 -0.2 0.1 -1.1 0.0 0.0 -0.4 -0.8 0.5 -3.4 -1.7
vegoil -29.7 9.2 -0.5 32.9 3.2 -8.9 32.6 18.9 -7.0 -21.7 -0.3 0.0 -3.9 -20.1 4.8 -87.8 14.2
refsgr 0.4 0.8 0.0 -1.8 -0.3 0.5 -0.1 -3.3 -3.9 4.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.6 0.7 -3.9 16.1 -0.8
rummt -6.7 -1.2 0.0 -6.9 3.8 -0.8 15.3 1.9 6.3 -15.8 0.0 0.0 -0.4 -33.5 -37.9 -49.3 22.3
nrummt 1.6 -0.2 0.1 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.5 3.8 -0.2 -2.3 0.0 0.0 -0.6 -3.8 -0.3 -8.4 -3.5
dairy 1.0 0.7 0.1 4.3 0.0 0.5 -0.7 1.0 2.3 6.6 0.0 0.0 1.6 5.8 23.1 8.6 -26.6
othprocfd 2.2 1.1 0.4 1.8 1.3 0.5 1.0 0.6 4.2 -2.2 0.1 0.0 0.5 -7.2 4.3 19.2 -13.1
mnfc -9.1 -1.8 0.4 2.9 0.9 -0.2 2.3 0.7 4.7 -11.0 0.1 0.0 -1.7 3.5 -8.2 610.5 -190.3
srvc 13.1 3.2 0.0 -6.1 0.1 -0.4 0.8 2.4 -1.7 7.8 0.0 0.0 5.1 -24.4 -0.2 232.9 -31.0
Source: Authors’ simulation results.19
Table 13
World price effects of comprehensive 50 per cent market price support reductions for OECD
agriculture, coupled with re-instrumentation
Contribution of import tariffs
Contribution of export
subsidies
Commodity
World
price
change EU USA Japan
Other
OECD EU
Other
OECD
pdrice 0.711 0.145 -0.004 0.44 0.088 0.039 0.003
wheat 0.794 0.072 -0.028 0.28 0.106 0.344 0.02
crsgrns 0.954 0.005 -0.074 0.122 0.145 0.744 0.012
oilsds 0.408 0.077 -0.068 0.26 0.127 0.008 0.004
rawsgr 0.205 0.14 0.063 0.036 -0.047 -0.007 0.02
othcrops 0.171 -0.008 0.049 0.092 0.022 -0.002 0.018
ruminants 0.031 -0.102 0.015 0.079 -0.016 -0.014 0.069
nonrumnts -0.119 -0.088 0 0.045 -0.065 -0.016 0.005
rawmilk 0.182 0.08 0.048 0.031 -0.074 -0.004 0.101
pcrice -0.209 -0.306 0.019 0.071 0.001 0.004 0.002
vegoilfat -0.095 0.018 -0.022 -0.008 -0.089 0.005 0.001
refsgr 0.071 0.005 0.044 0.023 0 -0.002 0.001
rummeat -0.068 -0.103 -0.011 0.039 0.006 -0.004 0.005
nrummeat -0.184 -0.125 -0.001 0.021 -0.065 -0.014 0
dairy -0.167 -0.14 0.004 0.012 -0.023 -0.021 0.001
othprfood -0.347 -0.099 -0.005 -0.016 -0.231 0.003 0.001
mnfc -0.025 -0.01 -0.002 -0.009 -0.003 -0.001 0
srvc -0.024 -0.008 -0.002 -0.008 -0.005 -0.001 0
Source: Authors’ simulations.20
Table 14
Developing region welfare changes: OECD re-instrumentation of agricultural support in
US$ millions (percentage change in parentheses)
Equivalent variation Terms of trade components
Region Total
Alloc.
efficiency I-S effect TOT
World
price
Export
price
Import
price
China -59.8
(-0.008)
-78.3 -6.2 24.8
(0.009)
-4.1
(-0.001)
57.6
(0.021)
-28.8
(0.011)
Indonesia -6.3
(-0.003)
-4.2 -0.6 -1.5
(-0.003)
-14.2
(-0.024)
18.3
(0.032)
-5.6
(0.001)
Vietnam 4.4
(0.023)
-1.5 -0.9 6.8
(0.077)
-0.4
(-0.005)
8.3
(0.094)
-1.1
(0.012)
ASEAN4 -34.3
(-0.009)
-16.8 -1.3 -16.2
(-0.004)
-21.5
(-0.006)
32.6
(0.009)
-27.3
(0.008)
India 0.6
(0.001)
-17.9 -0.5 19.0
(0.043)
-2.8
(-0.006)
26.0
(0.059)
-4.2
(0.010)
RsoAsia -17.7
(-0.015)
-5.4 -0.1 -12.3
(-0.042)
-11.3
(-0.039)
6.8
(0.024)
-7.9
(0.027)
Argentina 71.2
(0.024)
6.2 3.2 61.8
(0.221)
20.1
(0.072)
49.4
(0.177)
-7.7
(0.027)
Brazil 102.2
(0.015)
47.8 13.8 40.6
(0.082)
2.7
(0.005)
47.2
(0.096)
-9.4
(0.019)
RlatAmer 238.6
(0.056)
26.3 13.4 199.0
(0.174)
-3.8
(-0.003)
243.1
(0.213)
-40.4
(0.035)
MENA 15.6
(0.003)
56.6 -0.3 -40.7
(-0.016)
-31.4
(-0.013)
61.2
(0.024)
-70.6
(0.028)
Tanzania 3.3
(0.052)
0.6 0.6 2.1
(0.209)
0.7
(0.066)
1.6
(0.163)
-0.2
(0.019)
Zambia 0.2
(0.004)
-0.1 0.0 0.3
(0.029)
0.1
(0.006)
0.4
(0.032)
-0.1
(0.008)
R_SSA 90.5
(0.030)
17.2 0.7 72.7
(0.082)
11.8
(0.013)
76.2
(0.086)
-15.3
(0.017)
ROW 28.9
(0.004)
25.6 -1.2 4.5
(0.002)
-0.4
(-0.000)
15.7
(0.007)
-10.8
(0.005)
LDC Total 437.3 56.0 20.6 360.8 -54.5 644.4 -229.4
Source: Authors’ simulations.21
Table 15
Terms of trade welfare contribution decomposed by region and commodity: comprehensive 50 per cent reduction in OECD market price support, with
re-instrumentation in US$ millions
Export price effects by country
Com. China Indon. Vnam ASEAN Ind. RSoA Arg. Braz
Rlat
Amer MENA Tanz. Zamb. R_SSA ROW
Total
export
price
effect
World
price
effect
Import
price
effect
pdrice -0.6 0.0 -0.2 -0.5 -1.0 -0.3 -0.1 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -2.3 3.6 -0.6
wheat -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 0.0 -3.0 -0.1 0.1 -0.9 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.3 -4.7 -59.8 -38.7
crsgrns -5.7 -0.1 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 3.1 -0.3 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 -1.3 -0.6 -5.6 -18.6 -53.7
oilsds -0.4 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.5 -0.1 0.0 -1.9 3.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 -0.3 1.1 0.5 -0.7
rawsgr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0
othcrop 2.3 10.0 5.8 11.6 2.2 -0.1 6.8 3.4 122.9 9.3 0.6 0.1 34.4 1.7 210.8 47.8 -23.0
rumin 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 1.2 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.4 3.5 -0.7 -0.8
nrumin 6.1 0.6 0.3 1.4 0.3 0.2 0.9 0.5 2.0 2.2 0.1 0.0 1.3 1.2 16.9 -0.8 -2.3
rawmlk 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0
pcrice 1.1 0.3 1.2 5.6 4.2 1.4 0.6 0.0 1.8 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 16.8 -1.3 -10.6
vegoil 1.4 1.8 0.0 7.1 2.2 0.0 13.5 6.3 2.2 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 1.1 37.4 -1.7 -5.0
refsgr 0.1 0.0 0.0 1.6 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.9 6.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 1.2 0.0 10.2 1.5 0.5
rummt 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.0 3.1 0.5 3.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.2 8.2 0.4 -2.8
nrummt 5.1 0.0 0.1 1.8 0.0 0.0 1.7 4.0 1.7 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.3 1.5 16.7 -0.6 -7.0
dairy 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.2 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.7 4.1 7.7 -6.6
othprocfd 28.0 8.7 2.8 37.8 8.6 5.4 9.9 8.2 50.1 12.9 0.5 0.0 14.6 16.0 203.5 -32.6 -9.4
mnfc 19.8 -2.4 -1.3 -18.7 8.0 1.0 9.0 20.7 32.9 27.4 0.2 0.2 18.6 -2.8 112.4 0.7 -65.4
srvc -0.1 -0.7 -0.5 -15.2 1.9 -0.5 2.5 4.9 13.7 7.5 0.4 0.1 4.7 -3.0 15.5 -0.9 -3.4
Source: Authors’ simulation results.22
The third set of experiments detailed in the list involves a 50 per cent liberalization of
border measures relating to wheat in the EU15 while allowing area payments to adjust
to maintain the real farm income level in the EU15. This simulation provides the first
insight into changes in model variables that result from a politically feasible reform
scenario. In addition, the focus on reform in a single region-commodity pair provides a
good starting point for examining the mechanisms underlying the welfare impacts on
developing regions occurring from OECD reforms.
The final two sets of experiments consider more comprehensive reforms in which first
domestic support and then market price support are cut by 50 per cent in all OECD
countries. In the second simulation, domestic support is endogenized to offset the
adverse impacts of cuts in market price support for OECD farm incomes.
4.4 Differential impacts of alternative farm support policies
As described above, these experiments are useful because they provide comparative
static-based insights into what we can expect the changes in key model variables to be.
The shocks applied here are from those derived in Hertel (1989) as equal PSE shocks,
based on the assumption that there are no distortions in place initially. This exercise also
serves as a way to validate the model in light of the algebraically derived expected
results – setting the stage for more complex simulations. Results for the stylized PSE
shocks are given in the first four columns of Table 7.
The results shown above conform to those predicted in Hertel (1989) as well as to the
empirical results presented in the OECD (2001). An equal PSE increase to the subsidy
on variable inputs has the largest effect on wheat output, exports, and prices, as farmers
are encouraged to boost yields in the wake of cheaper land-substituting inputs. With
land becoming less scarce, returns to land decline under this scenario, therefore
contributing negatively to real farm income. This type of ‘subsidy’ does not benefit
farmers at all!
In contrast, subsidy payments to land used in production of wheat have the smallest
effects on output, exports, and price of wheat. With an inelastic supply of land to wheat
production, a substantial portion of the subsidy is capitalized in higher land values, and
farm income is increased substantially. This result is reinforced by the addition of a set-
aside requirement. Here, we apply a simple rule of proportionality. In the base year, the
set aside requirement was 10 per cent, so a 5 per cent increase in the land subsidy would
be accompanied by a 0.05 * 0.10 = 0.5 per cent increase in set aside.
The results for an output subsidy as compared to market price support show that for this
model as is seen in the results for OECD (2001), output subsidies have a larger effect on
output, producer prices, and farm income (through land rents) than does market price
support. In our model, the output subsidy is also more trade-distorting, which flies in the
face of simple theoretical results. This is due to the role of ‘own-use’ in the GTAP
model. Sectors tend to purchase their own output as an input. Under the output subsidy,
the cost of these ‘inputs’ falls, whereas it rises under the export subsidy.23
4.5 Interaction with existing subsidies
The stylized shock results assumed that there were no pre-existing subsidies in place in
order to highlight relative responsiveness to changes in different types of support.
However, given the initial distortions in place it is necessary to impose an equal PSE
condition on the model solution to arrive at actual equal PSE model results. Results for
simulations carried out under this condition are presented in the right hand four columns
of Table 7.
The first variable reported in Table 7 gives the initial ad valorem rate of the tax or
subsidy for each instrument. From this, it is clear that, in 1997, there was a very
substantial initial subsidy on land in EU wheat production. This means that the impact
of marginal changes in spending on the land subsidy will be blunted by the fact that a
given per unit subsidy will now represent a much smaller portion of the rental price of
land. This point is made forcefully by the OECD (2001) in their analysis of crop support
policies. This set of simulation results highlights this point, by evoking an actual equal
PSE response in each type of instrument that is very different than that observed under
the zero initial distortion assumption.
The results for a land subsidy under the actual equal PSE simulation shows the change
in land subsidy necessary to increase the PSE by one per cent and the associated
impacts of increasing support via area payments. Note that land returns in wheat and
farm income rise, but not by nearly as much as would have been expected based on the
results in column one of Table 7. Increasing the PSE in the EU15 by one per cent via an
output subsidy boosts land rents by nearly two-thirds as much as the land subsidy case –
whereas the same factor of proportion in column two of Table 7 was less than one tenth.
This is due to the fact that the initial level of output subsidy for EU wheat is negligible.
Clearly the initial level of support matters.
4.6 Policy re-instrumentation
A primary obstacle to reducing agricultural support in OECD agriculture is the adverse
impact on farm incomes. Given the differential impact of the various methods of
support used in OECD countries, as illustrated in Table 7, there appears to be scope for
re-instrumentation of support. This point is made quite clearly by Dewbre et al. (2001),
who show that market price support is a relatively inefficient means of transferring
income to farmers and furthermore, that it does so at the expense of relatively large
distortions in world markets. They show that, in contrast, land-based payments are
highly effective at transferring income to farmers, while reducing world market price
impacts of OECD agricultural policies. Therefore, we turn next to a simulation in which
market price support for EU wheat production is further reduced (by 50 per cent from
1997 levels), yet farm income is maintained at current levels by increased land-based
subsidies. This simulation is really just an extension of the kind of reform that the EU
has been undertaking over the past decade.
Reducing MPS by 50 per cent and maintaining farm incomes via area payments results
in an 8.6 percentage point increase in the power of the ad valorem land subsidy (treated
as a negative tax in the model). Note that we have not increased the set-aside
requirement in this case, since output falls due to the reduction in domestic prices. The
increased subsidy to wheat land results in increased returns to land employed in the24
wheat sector, which in turn attracts more land to this activity. With overall production
declining, this policy leads to a more extensive form of wheat production, with a decline
in the use of labour, capital and purchased inputs per hectare of land.
The decline in wheat production and increase in consumption due to lower domestic
prices causes wheat exports from the EU15 fall. This is further reinforced by the
reduction in export subsidies for wheat. Thus the export price of EU wheat rises. This
re-instrumentation leads to an increase in efficiency in the EU economy and a
subsequent welfare gain of US$188 million. With the exception of Argentina and
Zambia, the developing countries lose from higher wheat prices. The aggregate welfare
loss to developing countries totals US$65 million in this case. Given the goal of this
paper, a more refined examination of developing country welfare impacts in the wake of
the simulated reform is the appropriate place to turn our discussion.
4.7 Impacts on developing countries
The developing country impacts of the EU wheat reform summarized in Table 8 are
decomposed by region and welfare contribution in Table 9. Here, we follow the
approach of Huff and Hertel (1996) whereby regional welfare can be explained by
allocative efficiency effects and the terms of trade effects. The allocative efficiency
effects are due to second-best effects where a country benefits positively from increased
activity in industries that are taxed and negatively from the expansion of subsidized
industries. The terms of trade effects come from changes in a country’s export prices
relative to changes in its import prices. A country benefits positively from an increase in
its export prices and is negatively impacted by a net increase in the prices of goods that
it imports. As noted previously, since the developing country impacts of OECD reform
are transmitted through international markets, it is hardly surprising that the resulting
change in the terms of trade for these countries (TOT in Table 9) account for the bulk of
the developing country losses. Furthermore, with the exception of Argentina and
Zambia, all of the developing countries are made worse off due to the EU15 wheat
reform.
It is challenging to sort out the impact of changes in export and import prices of
different commodities in order to explain why a given country experiences a terms of
trade gain or loss. A helpful approach to decomposing the terms of trade effects is
provided by McDougall (1993) who decomposes the percentage change in the terms of
trade for a given region into three separate effects – the world price effect, the export
price effect and the import price effect:
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The world price effect equals the sum over all traded commodities of the product of a
country’s net trade share (the difference between export and import shares for
commodity i), (Si
Xr – Si
Mr), and the change in the price of i (for example, wheat), Pwi
relative to an index of average world prices for all products, Pw. (Lower case variables
denote percentage change so the difference in these two price changes represents the
percentage change in the price ratio.) The world price effect is positive in the case of a
net exporter of a commodity for which EU reform means higher world prices. However,
from Table 9 (see specialization indexes in parentheses below each country) we know
that most of these developing countries are net importers of wheat. Therefore this
component contributes negatively to their welfare.
The MENA region suffers the worst absolute and relative (percentage) deterioration in
terms of trade due to the world price effect, owing to MENA’s heavy reliance on
imports of wheat. Examining the entries in the world price effect column of Table 9, we
see that Argentina, which is a substantial net exporter of wheat, is the one country
which experiences a welfare gain from the higher world wheat prices. (Zambia is also a
small net exporter of wheat in our base period, but the gain on this commodity is offset
by losses on more important export commodities.)
The second component in the terms of trade decomposition is the export price effect
which is the sum of export share-weighted relative price changes where the relative
price change is the ratio of the exporter’s price for commodity i, PXir, relative to the
worldwide average price for commodity i, Pwi. Of course, if these commodities are
perfect substitutes, then this effect disappears since the two prices will not differ in the
case of a homogeneous commodity. The degree to which the two prices can diverge is
influenced by the degree of product differentiation in the market for commodity i. There
is product differentiation in all commodities in this model since the Armington trade
structure ensures that wheat produced in one country is differentiated from wheat
produced in another. The extent of differentiation is based on a new set of econometric
estimates undertaken at the GTAP level of aggregation, following the work of Hummels
(1999).
The export price effects in Table 9 are uniformly positive, with the exception of Zambia
and the rest of sub-Saharan Africa. These positive entries reflect the fact that increased
EU imports of wheat result in higher EU exports of other products, and thereby lower
EU export prices. Since the world average price for all goods is a weighted average of
all export prices, most non-EU export prices rise, relative to the average.
The import price component of the terms of trade decomposition is the mirror image of
the export price effect and refers to the import share-weighted change in the country-
specific import price index, PMir, relative to the average world price index, Pwi.
Developing countries tend to receive subsidized imports from the EU and so it is hardly
surprising that elimination of these subsidies results in higher average prices for
composite wheat imports. This effect is particularly important for MENA, rest of Latin
America, and rest of sub-Saharan Africa.
The final column in Table 9 reports a residual component of the developing country
welfare impacts that we have also included in the TOT total. This has to do with26
changes in the price of capital goods used for investment purposes. It is relatively minor
and will not be discussed further here.5
4.8 Analyzing the impact of comprehensive OECD agricultural reforms on
developing countries
Having worked through the basic mechanisms by which domestic support and
protection of OECD markets will affect the developing countries, we now ‘scale up’ this
analysis of one specific commodity to the global level by examining the combined
impact of cuts in support for all agricultural products in all OECD countries. We begin
by examining the impact of a 50 per cent cut in domestic support, then turn to an
experiment akin to the one discussed before whereby market price support is cut by 50
per cent, while domestic support in the form of area payments rises to stabilize OECD
farm incomes.
4.9 Cutting domestic support in the OECD
The first column of Table 10 reports the average world price impacts of cutting
domestic support for all agricultural commodities in the OECD by 50 per cent. It is
immediately clear that domestic support policies have the strongest impact on
programme crops and ruminant livestock (primarily beef). These are the commodities
where the world price increases are greatest. Sugar and dairy, where the bulk of
protection remains at the border, actually shows small price declines, as land and labour
shifts out of programme crops into other activities. This also causes other crop prices to
fall as well.
The remaining columns of Table 10 decompose the total world price effect by type of
domestic support policy instrument, including output subsidies, intermediate input
subsidies, land-based payments and capital subsidies (including livestock-based
payments). Despite the importance of land-based payments for programme crops in the
EU and USA, it is the intermediate input subsidies that contribute most to the world
price effects for these crops stemming from domestic support policies in the OECD. For
example, 1.7 per cent of the 4.9 per cent increase in the world price of wheat following
this cut in domestic support is attributed to the cut in intermediate input subsidies. This
is due to the fact that they are both important in the overall mix of support (see Table 1)
as well as highly distorting of world trade, as demonstrated in Table 7. In the case of the
strong increase in the price of ruminant meat, this is largely due to the subsidies on
animal numbers (capital subsidy).6
The impact of this domestic support reduction scenario on developing country welfare is
reported in the first column of Table 11. As can be seen from this Table, developing
countries as a group lose from this cut in OECD domestic support. The notable
                                                
5 For those familiar with GTAP, this is the component of the welfare decomposition that refers to the
purchases of savings from the ‘global bank’ and the sales of investment goods to that same entity. See
the technical paper by Huff and Hertel (1996) for further discussion and interpretation of this term.
6 These results can be compared roughly to those of Rae and Strutt (2002) by noting that they omit the
land and capital-based payments from their domestic support scenario, arguing that these are largely
‘blue box payments’ and therefore exempt from cuts under the Uruguay Round agreement.27
exceptions are Argentina, Brazil and India. The next two columns of this table
decompose these welfare effects into their allocative efficiency and terms of trade
components. As with the previous wheat example, the bulk of the developing country
losses are due to the deterioration of their terms of trade. The only case where the
allocative efficiency effect dominates is for China. This is largely driven by the
interaction between reduced oilseed imports from the USA, interacting with a very high
pre-WTO accession tariff on these imports. That tariff has since been dramatically
reduced as part of China’s WTO accession process (Ianchovichina and Martin 2002) so
this effect is no longer empirically relevant.
As before, we can decompose the terms of trade effect into its component parts to obtain
some further insight into the source of the developing country losses. This is done in the
subsequent three columns of Table 11. Note that the world price effects are dominant,
and negative, followed in magnitude by the export price effects which are positive for
developing countries as a group. The import price effects are negative, and considerably
smaller in absolute value.
Table 12 breaks out the world price effects by commodity and region. Recall that the
world price effect is positive when the price rises and the country is a net exporter and
negative when it is a net importer. For a world price decline, it is precisely the opposite.
From Table 10, recall that the world price rises were most dramatic for the programme
crops and for ruminant meats, while the biggest price decline is for other crops.
Furthermore, recall from Table 3 that developing countries tend to be net importers of
programme crops and livestock products, and net exporters of other crops. Therefore, it
is not surprising that the largest losses are for wheat, coarse grains, ruminant products
(net importers with a world price rise) and for other crops (net exporters with a
declining world price). From the point of view of an individual region/country, MENA
and rest of Latin America are among the hardest hit by these effects.
Recall, however, that our analytical framework takes into account the differentiation of
products by country of origin. So the export price effect can potentially offset or
reinforce the world price effect, depending on whether developing country export prices
rise or fall, relative to the world average. The last set of columns in Table 12 report the
export, import and total TOT price effects, by commodity for developing countries as a
group. Here, it can be seen that the product differentiation aspect of the analysis further
reinforces the adverse impacts on developing countries for wheat, coarse grains,
oilseeds, and ruminant products. However, in the case of other crops, which are quite
highly differentiated, the rise in developing country export prices, relative to the world
average, generates an overall gain. Developing countries also benefit overall from
developments in the global markets for manufactures and services.
In addition to the losses incurred by developing countries from the cuts to domestic
support in the OECD countries, there are substantial declines in OECD farm incomes.
The largest decline is in the EU15 (-16 per cent), followed by EFTA (-13 per cent), then
USA (-5 per cent) and Canada (-3.5 per cent). The losses in most other OECD countries
are under one per cent, due to relatively more reliance on border measures (Japan and
Korea – see Table 1) or lower levels of support (Australia and Canada). From a political
economy point of view, this kind of reform looks like a difficult one to sell. Therefore
we turn to an alternative type of comprehensive reform. This builds on the idea of re-
instrumentation that was developed in the first part of the paper.28
4.10 Re-instrumentation of agricultural support in the OECD
In this section of the paper we simulate an alternative type of comprehensive, OECD
reform focusing on reductions in market price support. Specifically, tariffs and export
subsidy rates in the OECD countries are cut by 50 per cent. Domestic support is actually
permitted to increase in order to compensate producers for the resulting loss in income.
As with our EU wheat example above, we use the land-based payments to compensate
producers, since they are the most efficient and least trade-distorting of the instruments
currently in use.
Table 13 reports the world price effects of the re-instrumentation experiment. The first
column reports the total effect, while the subsequent columns break this total into the
parts attributable to tariffs in the major OECD markets, as well as export subsidies (EU
and other OECD). The first thing to note is that the world price effects on programme
crops and ruminant products are far more modest than those following the domestic
support experiment. In general, the average world price of crops rises, while the average
world price of livestock products falls. The largest contributor to the higher rice prices
is the Japanese tariff cut. In the case of wheat prices, EU export subsidies, followed by
Japanese tariffs, are the largest contributions to the increase. The situation is similar for
coarse grains, where the majority of the world price impact is traced back to the
elimination of EU export subsidies. The average world farm gate price of sugar rises
due to cuts in the EU and US import tariffs. Meat and dairy prices world-wide are
heavily influenced by the EU tariff cuts. With a large share of the world’s output in the
EU, lower prices in that market contribute to a decline in the world average price.
Finally, in the case of other food products, the ‘other’ OECD countries tariffs appear to
play the largest role.
Table 14 reports the welfare impacts of the re-instrumentation experiment. Now we see
that, in sharp contrast to the domestic support experiment, most developing countries
gain from the liberalization. Only China, ASEAN4 and rest of South Asia lose, and
these losses are relatively small. As before the overall effects, as well as most of the
individual country effects, are dominated by the terms of trade changes. Two notable
exceptions are China and MENA where the allocative efficiency effect dominates the
terms of trade effect and changes the regional welfare outcome. In the case of China,
this is due to a reduction in other processed food output, which shows a much higher
rate of taxation than other sectors in this aggregation of the version 5 GTAP database.
This gives rise to an efficiency loss. For MENA, the source of the large efficiency gain
is due to the increase in imports. MENA’s imports of everything excepting programme
crops tend to increase only modestly. However, this region has very high rates of
protection on many of these products imported from the EU and EFTA – indeed much
higher than for most other products. Other processed food products is a case in point,
with an average bilateral tariff of 165 per cent on imports from the EFTA region. Thus
when other processed food products from EFTA increase, as a result of trade
liberalization in that region, there is a substantial efficiency gain for the MENA region.
However, in the aggregate, these efficiency gains are only a small portion of the total
developing country gains from the re-instrumentation experiment.
The breakout of the total regional terms of trade effects into their component parts in the
remaining columns of Table 14 reveals that, unlike the domestic support scenario, the
across-the-board cut to market price support is most strongly influenced by the export
price effect. With all OECD countries increasing their imports, and hence their exports,29
the average price of OECD exports falls for most products. This depresses the world
average price of most products, leaving the developing countries with a favourable
position for their export prices, relative to the world average. Both the world price effect
and the import price effect are still negative, but these are dominated by the strong
positive change in developing country export prices.
In order to explore the export price effect in greater detail, Table 15 presents this
component of each country’s terms of trade at the individual commodity level. Here, we
see that, apart from the programme commodities, almost all the export price effects are
positive, reflecting the general tendency of OECD export prices to fall, relative to those
of the developing countries. The total export price effect by commodity, summed over
all the developing countries, shows the largest positive effects for other crops and other
processed food products. Table 15 also reports the total world and import price effects,
by commodity, for the developing countries, as well as the total TOT effect (sum of
world, export and import effects). On a commodity basis, the only negative entries in
this final column pertain to wheat and coarse grains. All other commodities show a total
TOT effect that is positive for the developing countries.
6 Summary and conclusions
Long term support for agricultural programme commodities in OECD countries,
coupled with dis-protection in many developing countries, has left many of the latter
increasingly dependent on imports. In the historical overview section of this paper we
report trade specialization indexes over the past three decades for programme crops.
These represent the grains and oilseeds which receive a large share of the domestic
support in OECD countries. This measure is bounded between +1 and -1 and describes
the export (positive sign) and import (negative sign) orientation of each region. With
few exceptions, these show substantial declines over this period. For example, Indonesia
falls from -0.57 to -0.88 and ASEAN4 falls from +0.58 to +0.20. Several regions show
shifts from net exporter to net importer status. For example sub-Saharan Africa’s index
falls from +0.39 in the 1965-75 period to -0.17 in the 1986-98 period, while the trade
specialization index for Latin America outside of Brazil, Argentina and Mexico falls
from 0.36 to -0.08. As these developing countries have come to rely on imports of
grains and oilseeds from the subsidized OECD economies, they have become much
more exposed to agricultural reforms that raise the prices of these specific products. As
a result, we find that an across-the-board, 50 per cent cut in all domestic support for
OECD agriculture leads to welfare losses for most of the developing regions, as well as
for the combined total group of developing countries. The 50 per cent cut in domestic
support also results in large declines in farm incomes in Europe, and, to a lesser degree,
North America. This makes such a reform package an unlikely political event.
An alternative approach to reforming agricultural policies in the OECD would be to
focus on broad-based reductions in market price support. This has been occurring in a
number of OECD countries, most notably the EU where domestic support has
increasingly replaced border measures. As demonstrated in this paper, the basic
economic principles of agricultural support policies suggest that a shift from market
price support to land-based payments could generate a ‘win-win’ outcome whereby
farm incomes are maintained and world price distortions are reduced. This is the
direction charted by the OECD in its recent ‘Positive Reform Agenda’ for agriculture
(OECD 2002). We formally examine such an agricultural reform scenario,30
implementing a 50 per cent cut in market price support for OECD agriculture, with a
compensating set of land payments designed to maintain farm income in each of the
member economies. This comprehensive reform scenario results in increased welfare
for most developing countries, with gains on other commodities offsetting the terms of
trade losses from higher programme crop prices.
The preference for a continued focus on cuts in market price support, instead of shifting
the emphasis to domestic support cuts is also reflected in two recent papers by other
authors on this same general topic. Rae and Strutt (2002) conclude from their GTAP-
based comparison between border measures and domestic support that improved market
access generates far greater trade and welfare gains than domestic support cuts. This
leads them to propose that trade negotiators’ attention be focused squarely cuts to
border measures before turning any attention to domestic support.7 Hoekman et al.
(2002) focus on developing country impacts of OECD agricultural policies using a very
different approach, but they reach the same conclusion as this paper.8 They find that
namely that cuts to tariffs will generate much larger global welfare gains and positive
gains to developing countries, whereas cuts to domestic support lead to smaller global
welfare gains and losses for developing countries.
In summary, we conclude that developing countries will be well advised to focus their
efforts on improved market access to the OECD economies, while permitting these
wealthy economies to continue – indeed even increase – domestic support payments.
Provided these increased domestic support payments are not linked to output or variable
inputs, the trade-distorting effects are likely to be small, and they can be a rather
effective way of offsetting the potential losses that would otherwise be sustained by
OECD farmers. This type of policy re-instrumentation will increase the probability that
such reforms will be deemed politically acceptable in the OECD member economies,
while simultaneously increasing the likelihood that such reforms will also be beneficial
to the developing economies.
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